Luận án Ảnh hưởng của dòng tiền, rủi ro hệ thống, rủi ro phi hệ thống và tính thanh khoản chứng khoán đến đầu tư của doanh nghiệp Việt Nam

ge) nomata small twostep robust > sk l(1).SysDumGov l(2).idiorisk l(0,1,3).IdioDumGov l(1,4).turn l(0/3).LiquiDumGov l(1/2).cfk l(0,1,3).CFDumGov l(0,1,3).q l(1,3).sale l(0/3) . xtabond2 ik l.ik cfk CFDumGov sysrisk SysDumGov idiorisk IdioDumGov turn LiquiDumGov q size lev sale return age,gmm(l(1/4).ik l(1/3).sysri 30 PHỤ LỤC 4.14: KẾT QUẢ ƯỚC LƯỢNG CỘT 1 – BẢNG 4.12 . (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(69) = 64.42 Prob > chi2 = 0.634 (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(69) = 151.49 Prob > chi2 = 0.000 Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z = -1.04 Pr > z = 0.299 Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z = -2.63 Pr > z = 0.009 L4.size return L.return L2.return L3.return L4.return) collapsed L4.CFRateGov q L.q L2.q L3.q L4.q sale L4.sale L.lev L2.lev size L.size L.turn L3.turn L4.turn L2.cfk L3.cfk L4.cfk L2.CFRateGov L3.CFRateGov D.(L.ik L2.ik L3.ik L.sysrisk L2.sysrisk L3.sysrisk L.idiorisk L2.idiorisk GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) age _cons Standard Instruments for levels equation collapsed size L.size L4.size return L.return L2.return L3.return L4.return) L3.CFRateGov L4.CFRateGov q L.q L2.q L3.q L4.q sale L4.sale L.lev L2.lev L2.idiorisk L.turn L3.turn L4.turn L2.cfk L3.cfk L4.cfk L2.CFRateGov L(1/.).(L.ik L2.ik L3.ik L.sysrisk L2.sysrisk L3.sysrisk L.idiorisk GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) D.age Standard Instruments for first differences equation _cons -2.098833 .5851968 -3.59 0.000 -3.252609 -.9450572 age -.0105972 .1818439 -0.06 0.954 -.3691212 .3479268 return -.1086087 .0468648 -2.32 0.021 -.2010074 -.0162099 sale -.0475381 .0545183 -0.87 0.384 -.1550266 .0599503 lev .8621745 .2955203 2.92 0.004 .2795256 1.444823 size .2413582 .0765157 3.15 0.002 .0904996 .3922168 q -.0630448 .106452 -0.59 0.554 -.2729259 .1468362 turn 30.51263 10.01965 3.05 0.003 10.75785 50.26741 idiorisk .8285851 .4919446 1.68 0.094 -.1413345 1.798505 sysrisk -.1787841 .1059688 -1.69 0.093 -.3877126 .0301444 CFRateGov .0084498 .0049327 1.71 0.088 -.0012755 .0181752 cfk .299221 .1710445 1.75 0.082 -.0380109 .6364528 L1. .0537639 .0309989 1.73 0.084 -.0073537 .1148816 ik ik Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] Corrected Prob > F = 0.000 max = 5 F(11, 205) = 6.07 avg = 4.14 Number of instruments = 82 Obs per group: min = 1 Time variable : year Number of groups = 206 Group variable: firm Number of obs = 853 Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM Performing specification tests. > ............................................................................................................. Computing Windmeijer finite-sample correction.................................................................................................. Estimating. 51 instrument(s) dropped because of collinearity. Building GMM instruments................................... > l(2/4).cfk l(2/4).CFRateGov l(0/4).q l(0,4).sale l(1/2).lev l(0,1,4).size l(0/4).return,collapse) iv(age) nomata small twostep robust . xtabond2 ik l.ik cfk CFRateGov sysrisk idiorisk turn q size lev sale return age,gmm(l(1/3).ik l(1/3).sysrisk l(1/2).idiorisk l(1,3,4).turn 31 PHỤ LỤC 4.15: KẾT QUẢ ƯỚC LƯỢNG CỘT 2 – BẢNG 4.11 (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(78) = 65.03 Prob > chi2 = 0.853 (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(78) = 195.39 Prob > chi2 = 0.000 Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z = -1.14 Pr > z = 0.256 Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z = -2.67 Pr > z = 0.008 return L.return L2.return L3.return) collapsed L2.cfk L3.cfk L.CfkDumGov42 q sale L.sale L4.sale lev L.lev L4.lev size L.IdioDumGov42 L4.turn LiquiDumGov42 L2.LiquiDumGov42 L3.LiquiDumGov42 L2.SysDumGov42 L3.SysDumGov42 L2.idiorisk L3.idiorisk IdioDumGov42 D.(L.ik L2.ik L3.ik L4.ik L.sysrisk L3.sysrisk SysDumGov42 L.SysDumGov42 GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) age _cons Standard Instruments for levels equation L.lev L4.lev size return L.return L2.return L3.return) collapsed L3.LiquiDumGov42 L2.cfk L3.cfk L.CfkDumGov42 q sale L.sale L4.sale lev IdioDumGov42 L.IdioDumGov42 L4.turn LiquiDumGov42 L2.LiquiDumGov42 L.SysDumGov42 L2.SysDumGov42 L3.SysDumGov42 L2.idiorisk L3.idiorisk L(1/.).(L.ik L2.ik L3.ik L4.ik L.sysrisk L3.sysrisk SysDumGov42 GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) D.age Standard Instruments for first differences equation _cons -1.920351 .8326334 -2.31 0.022 -3.561974 -.2787283 age .0695091 .271088 0.26 0.798 -.4649689 .6039871 return -.1111345 .0471073 -2.36 0.019 -.2040114 -.0182576 sale -.0419074 .0813451 -0.52 0.607 -.2022877 .118473 lev 1.569919 .5653221 2.78 0.006 .4553282 2.68451 size .1228119 .1334321 0.92 0.358 -.1402634 .3858871 q .0534739 .1115683 0.48 0.632 -.1664945 .2734424 LiquiDumG~42 -45.19442 26.91328 -1.68 0.095 -98.25672 7.867891 turn 36.02853 16.32429 2.21 0.028 3.843499 68.21356 IdioDumGov42 -1.22815 .4640306 -2.65 0.009 -2.143035 -.3132662 idiorisk 1.139377 .6853149 1.66 0.098 -.2117921 2.490547 SysDumGov42 .5588936 .2597412 2.15 0.033 .046787 1.071 sysrisk -.3129169 .1666048 -1.88 0.062 -.6413955 .0155617 CfkDumGov42 .5962781 .3550934 1.68 0.095 -.1038253 1.296381 cfk .2782876 .1648068 1.69 0.093 -.046646 .6032212 L1. .065031 .0314838 2.07 0.040 .0029574 .1271046 ik ik Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] Corrected Prob > F = 0.000 max = 5 F(14, 205) = 4.58 avg = 4.14 Number of instruments = 94 Obs per group: min = 1 Time variable : year Number of groups = 206 Group variable: firm Number of obs = 853 Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM Performing specification tests. > ................................................................................................................... Computing Windmeijer finite-sample correction............................................................................................ Estimating. 49 instrument(s) dropped because of collinearity. Building GMM instruments.................................. > 42 l(0).q l(0,1,4).sale l(0,1,4).lev l(0).size l(0,1,2,3).return,collapse) iv(age) nomata small twostep robust > ik l(1,3).sysrisk l(0,1,2,3).SysDumGov42 l(2/3).idiorisk l(0,1).IdioDumGov42 l(4).turn l(0,2,3).LiquiDumGov42 l(2,3).cfk l(1).CfkDumGov . xtabond2 ik l.ik cfk CfkDumGov42 sysrisk SysDumGov42 idiorisk IdioDumGov42 turn LiquiDumGov42 q size lev sale return age,gmm(l(1/4). 32 PHỤ LỤC 4.16: KẾT QUẢ ƯỚC LƯỢNG CỘT 3 – BẢNG 4.11 (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(85) = 76.24 Prob > chi2 = 0.740 (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(85) = 181.92 Prob > chi2 = 0.000 Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z = -0.50 Pr > z = 0.618 Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z = -2.59 Pr > z = 0.010 L3.return) collapsed L2.sale L3.sale L2.lev L3.lev L4.lev size L.size return L2.return L3.cfk L4.cfk L.CfkDumGov51 L3.CfkDumGov51 q L.q L3.q L4.q sale L.sale IdioDumGov51 L3.IdioDumGov51 L.turn L2.turn L3.turn L4.turn LiquiDumGov51 L2.SysDumGov51 L3.SysDumGov51 idiorisk L2.idiorisk L3.idiorisk D.(L.ik L3.ik L.sysrisk L3.sysrisk SysDumGov51 L.SysDumGov51 GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) age _cons Standard Instruments for levels equation L3.return) collapsed L2.sale L3.sale L2.lev L3.lev L4.lev size L.size return L2.return L3.cfk L4.cfk L.CfkDumGov51 L3.CfkDumGov51 q L.q L3.q L4.q sale L.sale IdioDumGov51 L3.IdioDumGov51 L.turn L2.turn L3.turn L4.turn LiquiDumGov51 L2.SysDumGov51 L3.SysDumGov51 idiorisk L2.idiorisk L3.idiorisk L(1/.).(L.ik L3.ik L.sysrisk L3.sysrisk SysDumGov51 L.SysDumGov51 GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) D.age Standard Instruments for first differences equation _cons -2.068218 .7774733 -2.66 0.008 -3.601087 -.5353488 age -.0069414 .2009501 -0.03 0.972 -.4031353 .3892525 return -.0944417 .039955 -2.36 0.019 -.1732171 -.0156664 sale -.061915 .0849916 -0.73 0.467 -.2294848 .1056548 lev .6204761 .3123422 1.99 0.048 .0046611 1.236291 size .2740774 .1134015 2.42 0.017 .0504946 .4976601 q .0625039 .108112 0.58 0.564 -.1506501 .2756578 LiquiDumG~51 -7.052552 22.82221 -0.31 0.758 -52.0489 37.9438 turn 37.04869 13.56356 2.73 0.007 10.30672 63.79066 IdioDumGov51 -.896919 .4078852 -2.20 0.029 -1.701107 -.092731 idiorisk .577896 .3501934 1.65 0.100 -.1125465 1.268338 SysDumGov51 .3106896 .1870372 1.66 0.098 -.0580736 .6794527 sysrisk -.3029647 .144706 -2.09 0.038 -.5882674 -.0176619 CfkDumGov51 .7674529 .4570101 1.68 0.095 -.1335898 1.668496 cfk .3062731 .148959 2.06 0.041 .0125851 .5999611 L1. .0521648 .031428 1.66 0.098 -.0097987 .1141283 ik ik Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] Corrected Prob > F = 0.000 max = 5 F(14, 205) = 6.24 avg = 4.14 Number of instruments = 101 Obs per group: min = 1 Time variable : year Number of groups = 206 Group variable: firm Number of obs = 853 Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM Performing specification tests. > ................................................................................................................... Computing Windmeijer finite-sample correction............................................................................................ Estimating. 57 instrument(s) dropped because of collinearity. Building GMM instruments....................................... > l(0,1,3,4).q l(0/3).sale l(2,3,4).lev l(0,1).size l(0,2,3).return,collapse) iv(age) nomata small twostep robust > k l(1,3).sysrisk l(0/3).SysDumGov51 l(0,2,3).idiorisk l(0,3).IdioDumGov51 l(1/4).turn l(0).LiquiDumGov51 l(3/4).cfk l(1,3).CfkDumGov51 . xtabond2 ik l.ik cfk CfkDumGov51 sysrisk SysDumGov51 idiorisk IdioDumGov51 turn LiquiDumGov51 q size lev sale return age,gmm(l(1,3).i 33 PHỤ LỤC 4.17: KẾT QUẢ ƯỚC LƯỢNG CỘT 2 – BẢNG 4.13 . (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(64) = 57.94 Prob > chi2 = 0.689 (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(64) = 222.57 Prob > chi2 = 0.000 Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z = -0.91 Pr > z = 0.360 Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z = -2.80 Pr > z = 0.005 collapsed L2.lev L4.lev size L3.size L4.size return L.return L2.return L4.return) L2.idiorisk L2.turn L4.turn cfk q L2.q L3.q L4.q L.sale L2.sale lev L.lev D.(L.ik L2.ik L3.ik L2.sysrisk L3.sysrisk L.SysRateGov L.idiorisk GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) L.age _cons Standard Instruments for levels equation collapsed L2.lev L4.lev size L3.size L4.size return L.return L2.return L4.return) L2.idiorisk L2.turn L4.turn cfk q L2.q L3.q L4.q L.sale L2.sale lev L.lev L(1/.).(L.ik L2.ik L3.ik L2.sysrisk L3.sysrisk L.SysRateGov L.idiorisk GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) D.L.age Standard Instruments for first differences equation _cons -1.867208 .87587 -2.13 0.034 -3.594076 -.1403394 age .2802719 .2812843 1.00 0.320 -.2743092 .834853 return -.1746309 .0444713 -3.93 0.000 -.2623107 -.0869511 sale .1130078 .1888273 0.60 0.550 -.2592848 .4853005 lev .9272541 .5411817 1.71 0.088 -.1397416 1.99425 size .1363402 .1438666 0.95 0.344 -.1473077 .4199882 q .0722593 .1160612 0.62 0.534 -.1565674 .301086 turn 43.59959 14.58771 2.99 0.003 14.83841 72.36076 idiorisk .982392 .478174 2.05 0.041 .0396224 1.925162 SysRateGov .0069756 .0038299 1.82 0.070 -.0005754 .0145267 sysrisk -.4652014 .1965496 -2.37 0.019 -.8527193 -.0776834 cfk .2013774 .1101716 1.83 0.069 -.0158372 .4185921 L1. .1317525 .0377034 3.49 0.001 .0574164 .2060886 ik ik Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] Corrected Prob > F = 0.000 max = 5 F(11, 205) = 12.09 avg = 4.14 Number of instruments = 77 Obs per group: min = 1 Time variable : year Number of groups = 206 Group variable: firm Number of obs = 853 Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM Performing specification tests. > ............................................................................................................. Computing Windmeijer finite-sample correction.................................................................................................. Estimating. 39 instrument(s) dropped because of collinearity. Building GMM instruments............................. > t > k l(2,4).turn l(0).cfk l(0,2,3,4).q l(1/2).sale l(0,1,2,4).lev l(0,3,4).size l(0,1,2,4).return,collapse) iv(l.age) nomata small twostep robus . xtabond2 ik l.ik cfk sysrisk SysRateGov idiorisk turn q size lev sale return age,gmm(l(1/3).ik l(2/3).sysrisk l(1).SysRateGov l(1/2).idioris 34 PHỤ LỤC 4.18: KẾT QUẢ ƯỚC LƯỢNG CỘT 3 – BẢNG 4.13 . (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(69) = 72.09 Prob > chi2 = 0.376 (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(69) = 176.63 Prob > chi2 = 0.000 Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z = -1.19 Pr > z = 0.235 Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z = -2.55 Pr > z = 0.011 return L2.return L3.return L4.return) collapsed L3.cfk L.q L2.q sale L.sale L2.sale L3.sale L4.sale lev L.lev size L4.size L.idiorisk L2.idiorisk IdioRateGov L.IdioRateGov L.turn L4.turn L2.cfk D.(L.ik L2.ik L3.ik sysrisk L.sysrisk L2.sysrisk L3.sysrisk L4.sysrisk GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) age _cons Standard Instruments for levels equation L4.size return L2.return L3.return L4.return) collapsed L2.cfk L3.cfk L.q L2.q sale L.sale L2.sale L3.sale L4.sale lev L.lev size L4.sysrisk L.idiorisk L2.idiorisk IdioRateGov L.IdioRateGov L.turn L4.turn L(1/.).(L.ik L2.ik L3.ik sysrisk L.sysrisk L2.sysrisk L3.sysrisk GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) D.age Standard Instruments for first differences equation _cons -1.663758 .7609062 -2.19 0.030 -3.163964 -.1635528 age -.3573676 .2168587 -1.65 0.101 -.7849269 .0701918 return -.0747099 .0366087 -2.04 0.043 -.1468878 -.002532 sale -.0131646 .078412 -0.17 0.867 -.1677619 .1414328 lev .8951205 .415935 2.15 0.033 .0750615 1.715179 size .252793 .1185034 2.13 0.034 .0191513 .4864348 q -.0318319 .1291571 -0.25 0.806 -.2864784 .2228146 turn 18.89981 9.953877 1.90 0.059 -.72529 38.52491 IdioRateGov -.0173627 .0093511 -1.86 0.065 -.0357994 .001074 idiorisk 1.060233 .6176808 1.72 0.088 -.157589 2.278054 sysrisk -.24823 .1156803 -2.15 0.033 -.4763057 -.0201544 cfk .5397136 .150188 3.59 0.000 .2436024 .8358249 L1. .0548281 .0300478 1.82 0.070 -.0044143 .1140705 ik ik Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] Corrected Prob > F = 0.000 max = 5 F(11, 205) = 7.76 avg = 4.14 Number of instruments = 82 Obs per group: min = 1 Time variable : year Number of groups = 206 Group variable: firm Number of obs = 853 Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM Performing specification tests. > ............................................................................................................. Computing Windmeijer finite-sample correction.................................................................................................. Estimating. 49 instrument(s) dropped because of collinearity. Building GMM instruments................................ > teGov l(1,4).turn l(2/3).cfk l(1/2).q l(0/4).sale l(0,1).lev l(0,4).size l(0,2,3,4).return,collapse) iv(age) nomata small twostep robust . xtabond2 ik l.ik cfk sysrisk idiorisk IdioRateGov turn q size lev sale return age,gmm(l(1/3).ik l(0/4).sysrisk l(1/2).idiorisk l(0/1).IdioRa 35 PHỤ LỤC 4.19: KẾT QUẢ ƯỚC LƯỢNG CỘT 4 – BẢNG 4.13 . (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(63) = 67.99 Prob > chi2 = 0.311 (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(63) = 161.80 Prob > chi2 = 0.000 Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z = -0.81 Pr > z = 0.416 Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z = -2.71 Pr > z = 0.007 L4.size return L3.return L4.return) collapsed sale L.sale L4.sale lev L.lev L2.lev L3.lev L4.lev size L.size L3.size L2.idiorisk L3.idiorisk L4.turn L.LiquiRateGov L4.LiquiRateGov L3.cfk L.q D.(L.ik L2.ik L3.ik L4.ik L.sysrisk L2.sysrisk L3.sysrisk L.idiorisk GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) age L.age _cons Standard Instruments for levels equation L4.size return L3.return L4.return) collapsed sale L.sale L4.sale lev L.lev L2.lev L3.lev L4.lev size L.size L3.size L2.idiorisk L3.idiorisk L4.turn L.LiquiRateGov L4.LiquiRateGov L3.cfk L.q L(1/.).(L.ik L2.ik L3.ik L4.ik L.sysrisk L2.sysrisk L3.sysrisk L.idiorisk GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) D.(age L.age) Standard Instruments for first differences equation _cons -1.945104 .7937981 -2.45 0.015 -3.510159 -.380049 age -.3339645 .2210758 -1.51 0.132 -.7698382 .1019092 return -.0918861 .04754 -1.93 0.055 -.1856161 .001844 sale .0074831 .0636448 0.12 0.907 -.1179992 .1329653 lev .938745 .3985479 2.36 0.019 .1529667 1.724523 size .2591817 .1148397 2.26 0.025 .0327634 .4856 q -.087202 .140677 -0.62 0.536 -.3645613 .1901573 LiquiRateGov -.6228828 .3422152 -1.82 0.070 -1.297595 .0518299 turn 50.08811 16.23861 3.08 0.002 18.072 82.10422 idiorisk 1.075272 .6499564 1.65 0.100 -.2061846 2.356728 sysrisk -.2527804 .151973 -1.66 0.098 -.5524108 .0468501 cfk .4267267 .140521 3.04 0.003 .149675 .7037785 L1. .0648052 .0283879 2.28 0.023 .0088356 .1207748 ik ik Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] Corrected Prob > F = 0.000 max = 5 F(11, 205) = 8.55 avg = 4.14 Number of instruments = 76 Obs per group: min = 1 Time variable : year Number of groups = 206 Group variable: firm Number of obs = 853 Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM Performing specification tests. > ............................................................................................................. Computing Windmeijer finite-sample correction.................................................................................................. Estimating. 42 instrument(s) dropped because of collinearity. Building GMM instruments............................... > ust > (1,4).LiquiRateGov l(3).cfk l(1).q l(0,1,4).sale l(0/4).lev l(0,1,3,4).size l(0,3,4).return,collapse) iv(l(0/1).age) nomata small twostep rob . xtabond2 ik l.ik cfk sysrisk idiorisk turn LiquiRateGov q size lev sale return age,gmm(l(1/4).ik l(1/3).sysrisk l(1/3).idiorisk l(4).turn l 36 PHỤ LỤC 4.20: KẾT QUẢ ƯỚC LƯỢNG CỘT 5 – BẢNG 4.13 . (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(81) = 81.83 Prob > chi2 = 0.453 (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(81) = 216.34 Prob > chi2 = 0.000 Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z = -1.16 Pr > z = 0.246 Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z = -2.62 Pr > z = 0.009 return L2.return) collapsed L3.CFRateGov q L3.q L.sale L2.sale lev L2.lev L3.lev size L.size L3.size L.LiquiRateGov L3.LiquiRateGov L.cfk L2.cfk CFRateGov L.CFRateGov IdioRateGov L3.IdioRateGov L.turn L2.turn L4.turn LiquiRateGov D.(L.ik L2.ik L3.ik L4.ik L.sysrisk L2.sysrisk L2.SysRateGov L.idiorisk GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) age _cons Standard Instruments for levels equation return L2.return) collapsed L3.CFRateGov q L3.q L.sale L2.sale lev L2.lev L3.lev size L.size L3.size L.LiquiRateGov L3.LiquiRateGov L.cfk L2.cfk CFRateGov L.CFRateGov L.idiorisk IdioRateGov L3.IdioRateGov L.turn L2.turn L4.turn LiquiRateGov L(1/.).(L.ik L2.ik L3.ik L4.ik L.sysrisk L2.sysrisk L2.SysRateGov GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) D.age Standard Instruments for first differences equation _cons -2.014815 .9063687 -2.22 0.027 -3.801815 -.2278154 age .166331 .3182255 0.52 0.602 -.4610834 .7937455 return -.1295223 .0403057 -3.21 0.002 -.2089891 -.0500555 sale -.1441442 .2005506 -0.72 0.473 -.5395504 .2512621 lev 1.485499 .6278935 2.37 0.019 .2475421 2.723456 size .1348333 .1416153 0.95 0.342 -.1443761 .4140426 q -.008835 .135995 -0.06 0.948 -.2769631 .2592932 LiquiRateGov -1.09364 .6447782 -1.70 0.091 -2.364887 .1776075 turn 55.85335 22.4854 2.48 0.014 11.52106 100.1856 IdioRateGov -.035839 .0115955 -3.09 0.002 -.0587008 -.0129771 idiorisk 1.797106 .6979896 2.57 0.011 .4209474 3.173265 SysRateGov .0176689 .0073852 2.39 0.018 .0031082 .0322295 sysrisk -.6723897 .2542185 -2.64 0.009 -1.173608 -.1711717 CFRateGov .0120582 .0071115 1.70 0.091 -.0019628 .0260792 cfk .2890824 .1718796 1.68 0.094 -.0497959 .6279608 L1. .0972537 .035105 2.77 0.006 .0280406 .1664668 ik ik Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] Corrected Prob > F = 0.000 max = 5 F(14, 205) = 4.26 avg = 4.14 Number of instruments = 97 Obs per group: min = 1 Time variable : year Number of groups = 206 Group variable: firm Number of obs = 853 Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM Performing specification tests. > ............................................................................................................. Computing Windmeijer finite-sample correction.................................................................................................. Estimating. 49 instrument(s) dropped because of collinearity. Building GMM instruments.................................. > l(0,2,3).lev l(0,1,3).size l(0,2).return,collapse) iv(age) nomata small twostep robust > risk l(2).SysRateGov l(1).idiorisk l(0,3).IdioRateGov l(1,2,4).turn l(0,1,3).LiquiRateGov l(1/2).cfk l(0,1,3).CFRateGov l(0,3).q l(1/2).sale . xtabond2 ik l.ik cfk CFRateGov sysrisk SysRateGov idiorisk IdioRateGov turn LiquiRateGov q size lev sale return age,gmm(l(1/4).ik l(1/2).sys 37 PHỤ LỤC 4.21: ĐẶC ĐIỂM TÀI CHÍNH CỦA CÁC DOANH NGHIỆP HẠN CHẾ TÀI CHÍNH ĐƯỢC XÁC ĐỊNH THEO QUY MÔ TỔNG TÀI SẢN Biến Toàn mẫu Nhóm FC Nhóm (PFC+NFC) I/K 41.85% 41.23% 42.22% CF/K 60.71% 69.55% 55.47% SysRisk 0.93 0.86 0.96 IdioRisk 42.99% 48.57% 39.69% Turn 4.70 5.21 4.39 M/B 1.02 0.97 1.05 Lev 48.78% 40.90% 53.45% Sale 17.00% 13.18% 19.26% Return -13.46% -13.37% -13.51% Age (năm) 7.37 8.06 6.96 Gov 30.96% 31.02% 30.92% ROE 14.94% 14.94% 14.93% EPS (Đồng/cp) 3,262 3,101 3,358 i TÀI LIỆU THAM KHẢO  Danh mục tài liệu tiếng Việt: 1. 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