Seasoned equity offerings evidence in Vietnamese stock market
          
        
            
               
            
 
            
                
                    Ho Chi Minh stock market is not efficient in term of semi-strong form. Before the
announcement day, there is a trend of stock purchasing, which is a sign of
information leakage. The market is not efficient means that 1) the information is
not transparent; 2) there are information asymmetries among groups of investor
3) information is leaked before the official information are made available to
public. We suggest that SEOs companies should strengthen the information
dissemination activities by following regulations in information dissemination of
state securities commission of Vietnam in a serious, strict manner and closely
monitored the compliance with information dissemination regulations to
guarantee the transparency, fairness and effectiveness to deal with the situation of
unbalanced information and protect individual investors
                
              
                                            
                                
            
 
            
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owth: annual growth 
rate of sales. 
- Investment: fixed 
investment, where 
Investment is measured as 
the changes in fixed assets 
scaled by total assets of 
the firm. 
- Tradeoff: difference 
between the firm i’s 
leverage and the average 
leverage of other firms in 
the same industry. 
- Overvalue: difference 
between the firm i’s 
market to book ratio and 
the average market to 
book ratio of all other 
firms in the same industry 
in the same year. 
- EAE: extra 
administrative expenses= 
difference between the 
firm i’s administrative 
expenses and the average 
administrative expenses 
of all other firms in the 
same industry 
- Nontradable : ratio of 
Market timing 
encourages Chinese 
companies to conduct 
SEOs. 
 Investment and 
growth theory 
experience weak 
empirical support 
while there are no 
evidence to support 
tradeoff and agency 
theories 
2 
non-tradable 
shareholdings to total 
shares outstanding 
- Industry: dummy 
variables 
- Gap: the number of years 
between the current SEOs 
and the last SEOs 
- Next: a dummy variable 
that takes the value of one 
if the firm issue SEOs in 
the next 3 years after the 
current SEOs. 
- Size: logarithm of total 
assets. 
- Profit: earnings before 
interests and tax scaled by 
total assets 
- Debt: ratio of total debt 
to total assets of the firm 
- Volatility: difference 
between the standard 
deviation of the firm i’s 
daily stock returns and the 
average standard 
deviation of daily stock 
returns of other firms in 
the same industry. 
2 Chikolwa and 
Kim (2009) 
S&P/ASX 
300 Index 
2000-
2008 
Probit 
model 
Examining 
SEOs 
motivation 
ofAustralian 
Real Estate 
Trusts and the 
market reaction. 
- Company size 
- Profitability 
- Growth 
opportunities 
- Tangibility: 
SEOit: dummy 
variable that 
equals 1 if an 
A-REIT i issued 
a SEO in year 
t, otherwise 0 
- SIZ: natural logarithm of 
total assets 
- Profitability: return on 
assets (ROA) 
- TOQ: ratio of the market 
value of equity plus the 
book value of debt to 
- the book value of assets 
- PPT: ratio of book value 
- Companies with 
higher leverage are 
less likely to issue 
SEOs. 
- Significant 
negative abnormal 
return is related to 
SEOs 
announcement 
3 
- Operating risk: 
- Leverage: 
- Others 
of property to total assets 
- SDE: standard deviation 
of EBIT scaled by total 
assets for each firm over 
the entire period covered 
- LTA: : the ratio of total 
liability to total asset 
- DUMp,i: property sector 
dummy variables of 1 or 0 
otherwise 
- DUMs,i: stapled structure 
management dummy 
variable of 1 or 0 
otherwise 
- DUMI,i: international 
operations dummy 
variable of 1 or 0 
otherwise 
with no evidence 
of information 
leakage. 
- Market reaction 
differently to 
announcements of 
SEOs in different 
market period. 
3 DeAngelo et. 
al. (2010) 
CRSP 
1975-
2001 
Logit 
regressi
on 
Assessing the 
positive relation 
between 
likelihood that 
company 
conduct SEO 
and its 
standardized 
M/B ratio as 
well as market 
return, and 
negative relation 
to its future AR 
and number of 
listed years. 
Market timing. SEOit: equals 
one if the firm 
conducts an SEO 
in the year in 
question and 
zero otherwise. 
- The standardized M/B 
ratio 
- The market-adjusted stock 
return over the 36 months 
ending immediately 
before the year in 
question. 
- The market-adjusted 
return over the 36-month 
Companies with 
higher M/B and three 
preceding year AR 
are more likely to 
issue SEOs. 
4 Jung et. al 
(1996) 
US 1977-
1984 
Logisti
c 
regressi
Investigating the 
explanatory 
power of 
- Taxation 
- Costs of financial 
SEOit: dummy 
variable, takes 
the value one for 
- Tax payment/TA: tax 
payments/book value of 
total assets 
The authors support 
the agency model 
while experience the 
4 
on pecking order 
model, agency 
model, timing 
model to 
determination of 
financing 
resources as 
well as market 
reaction. 
distress. 
- Probability 
- Risk 
- Investment 
opportunity 
- Market timing 
- Others (Total 
assets; Gross 
proceeds/MVCS; 
Log of 
(Amount/MVCS) 
equity issues and 
zero otherwise. 
- Long-term debt/TA: long 
term debts/ book value of 
total assets 
- Cash flow: (operating 
income before 
depreciation – total taxes 
adjusted for changes in 
deferred taxes – gross 
interest expense – 
dividend paid)/total assets 
- Stock return volatility 
6-month leading indicator 
- Market-to-book 
- Past 11month cumulative 
excess return 
- Cash and liquid/total 
assets 
- Post-issue 5-year excess 
returns 
- Total assets 
- Gross proceeds/Market 
value of equity 
- Log of (Amount/MVCS) 
failure for pecking 
order and timing 
model. 
5 Abraham et. 
al. (2011) 
US 2002 - 
2005 
Logisti
c 
model 
Proposing a 
method 
to estimate the 
features of 
SEOs 
companies. 
Company liquidity P(SEO offering): 
taking values of 
1 if the firm had 
a probability of 
SEO offerings or 
) otherwise 
- RE: retained earnings 
measured by common 
equity 
- LTD: long-term debt 
- CE: capital expenditure 
- D: dividends 
- DR: debt reduction 
- CD: current debt 
- C: cash and short-term 
investment 
- NI: net income 
Companies with 
strong fundamental 
have more tendency 
to conduct SEOs. 
5 
6 Jeanneret 
(2003) 
France 
1984 - 
2000 
Probit 
model 
Testing whether 
the relation 
between the 
informational 
content of 
equity offering 
announcements 
and their effect 
on company 
value depends 
on the offering 
purpose. 
- Information 
asymmetry 
- Risk 
- Tradeoff theory 
- Other Control 
Variables 
I: dummy 
variable, takes 
the value one for 
equity issues and 
zero otherwise. 
- ROA: Return on Assets 
- Runup: Issuer’s stock 
price runup computed 
over the 250 trading days 
- Mrunup: stock market 
runup computed over the 
250 trading days prior 
- Mvol: Market volatility 
computed over 75 trading 
days 
- Δcredit: Credit spread 
(difference in yield 
between 10 year French 
corporate bonds and 10-
year French government 
bonds) 
- Δterm: Term spread 
(difference in interest rate 
between 10 year French 
government bonds and 1-
month Euro FRF rate) 
- Specific: volatility of the 
market model residuals 
estimated over the pre-
announcement period [-
255;-6] 
- Δtarget: Deviation from 
the industry median 
leverage ratio (debt over 
assets in book values) 
- FCF: Free cash flow 
(over assets in book 
value) 
- MB: the last pre-SEO 
fiscal year book value of 
equity divided by the 
corresponding market 
- The SEOs 
announcements 
convey 
unpredicted 
company value 
information. 
- Information 
released in the 
prospectus 
increases the 
explanatory power 
of the valuation 
effect at the 
announcement. 
6 
value of equity 
- Size: Log of the market 
capitalization 
7 Elliott et. al. 
(2008) 
 US 1980 
- 1999 
Logit 
model 
Testing the 
market timing 
theory of capital 
structure using 
an earnings-
based valuation 
model 
- Growth options 
(CapEX; R&D) 
- Size 
- Tangibility 
- Profitability 
- Depreciation 
- Target 
leverage(Target-
Leverage; 
IdnLeverage) 
- Credit quality 
- Tax benefits 
- Interest rates 
 - Others 
IssueTypej: takes 
the value of 1 for 
debt and the a 
value of 0 for 
equity 
- CapEx: apital 
expenditures divided by 
total assets 
- R&D: ratio of research 
and development expense 
to total assets 
- Ln Sales 
- Tangibility: ratio of fixed 
assets to total assets 
- Profitability: 
EBITDA/Assets 
- Depreciation: ratio of 
depreciation expense to 
total assets 
- Target-Leverage = (Total 
Assets – Book Equity)/ 
Total Assets 
- IdnLeverage: median of 
industry leverage. 
- Tax Rate: marginal tax 
rate of the firm based on 
the marginal tax rates 
- Debt capacity – leverage: 
debt/total assets 
- 3 year mean ROA 
- 2-year stock return: 
- Market-to-book ratio: 
market value of equity in 
the month prior to the 
issue. 
- Firms whose 
equity is 
overvalued are 
significantly more 
likely to issue 
equity 
- Equity mispricing 
plays important 
role on financing 
decision 
8 Eric Duca 
(2011) 
US 1980-
2007 
Probit 
model 
Testing the 
effect of timing 
the market on 
returns after 
- Matket timing (6 
Mth. post-previous 
rets. (12 Mth. 
post-previous 
Probability of 
issuing equity 
for firms takes 
value 1 if a 
- 6 Mth. post-previous rets. 
(12 Mth. post-previous 
rets.): buy and hold 
returns over the 6 month 
- Market timing is 
commonly cited as 
a determinant of 
equity issues, 
7 
seasoned equity 
of US 
companies from 
1980-2007 
rets.); 6 Mth. post-
IPO rets. (12 Mth. 
post-IPO rets.)) 
- Information 
asymmetry 
- Risk 
- Information 
asymmetry 
- Tax 
- Growth 
opportunity 
(Tobin's Q; 
R&D expense). 
- Tradeoff theory 
firm makes an 
issue in a firm 
- year and 0 
otherwise 
(12 month) period after a 
previous SEO 
- 6 Mth. post-IPO rets. (12 
Mth. post-IPO rets.): buy 
and hold returns over 
the 6 month (12 month) 
period after a previous 
IPO 
- Abn. Stock return: The 
raw cumulative stock 
return over trading days - 
62 to - 2 prior to the 
announcement date less 
the CRSP equally 
weighted market index 
return over the same 
period 
- Stock Volatility: 
annualized standard 
deviation of daily stock 
returns over trading days - 
62 to - 2 before the 
announcement date 
- Slack: Cash and short - 
term investment divided 
by total assets 
- Fixed assets 
- Ln(Sales): natural 
logarithm of total sales 
- Taxes: tax/total assets 
- Tobin's Q 
- R&D expense 
- 
- Leverage-Target: 
deviation of the market 
leverage from the target 
although the cost 
of timing equity 
offerings on future 
issues are not 
well known 
- Following an 
equity issue, firms 
are more likely to 
switch to debt if 
they had timed 
their previous 
equity offering. 
8 
- Market timing 
- Others 
leverage 
- Market runup: return on 
the S&P 500 index over 
the quarter preceding the 
issue date 
- KZ index: Kaplan and 
Zingales Index 
- Age: difference, between 
the issue date and the date 
that the firm first appears 
in the CRSP database. 
- Interest rates: 
- Default premium: 
difference between yields 
on Baa rated corporate 
Bonds and Aaa bonds 
- Years previous issue: 
number of years that 
have elapsed since the 
previous issue 
- Previous underpricing: 
logarit of (closed day 
price of day before 
announcement/announce
ment day price) 
- IPO underpricing: 
- Confidence Index: 
average level of the 
University of Michigan 
Consumer Sentiment 
Index over the three 
months prior to issuance 
9 A. Altı, J. 
Sulaeman 
(2012) 
US 1985 
- 2005 
Probit 
model 
To investigate 
the 
consideration of 
- Market timing 
opportunities and 
growth prospects 
Pr(SEOannounc
ement): 
probability that 
- Lagged six month stock 
return: stock returns 6 
months before 
- High stock returns 
accompanied by 
strong investor 
9 
company when 
timing the 
SEOs. 
- Information 
asymmetry 
- Investment and 
growth 
(Investment and 
R&D). 
- Others 
company will 
announce its 
SEO 
announcement day. 
- M/B: market value/book 
value ratio 
- Firm size: Logarithm of 
firm book value 
- Profitability: 
EBITDA/book value of 
total assets 
- Investment: capital 
expenditure/book value 
of total assets 
- R&D: R&D expenses/ 
book value of total assets 
- Firm age: Logarithm of 
the number of quarters 
since the first appearance 
of the firm CRSP 
- Volatility: Annualized 
standard deviation of 
daily stock returns 
measured over one 
quarter 
- IPO dummy: Indicator 
variable: one if the firm 
has been public for less 
than two year 
- Turnover: Quarterly 
share trading volume 
divided by shares 
outstanding 
- Institutional ownership: 
Fraction of shares 
outstanding owned by 
institutional investors 
- Leverage: Book debt 
divided by book assets. 
demand trigger 
SEOs. 
- Institutional 
purchases instead 
of stock price 
increase strongly 
affect company’s 
SEOs motivation.1 
1 Huang (2012) China Logisti Discuss and - Tradeoff theory    : = 1 if - Lev_indus    : the firm’s Companies with 
10 
(Source: author’s recapitulation) 
0 (CCER) 
1994 - 
2006 
c 
model 
examine the 
motivation to 
conduct SEO of 
listed Chinese 
companies. 
- Information 
asymmetry 
theory. 
- Agency cost 
- Others (TIME ; 
Size    ; 
YrEI  ; 	Profit    
; Lev     
RevG    ) 
company 
conducts SEO in 
year t; 0: 
otherwise 
leverage minus 
- industry average; 
- 	PSR    : six-month 
share returns prior to the 
SEO 
- OwnCon ,   : average 
ownership concentration. 
- ManHold ,   : average 
managerial holding 
- TIME : = 1 if the year is 
before 2002, and 0 
- if the year is during 2002 
and 2006 
- 	Size    : the natural log 
of the firm’s total assets. 
- YrEI  : years since the 
firm’s last equity 
- issue which includes the 
IPO and SEOs	 
- Profit    : EBIT divided 
by total assets. 
- RevG    : the percentage 
change in operating 
revenue 
higher leverage in 
comparison to their 
optimal leverage, 
higher stock returns, 
weaker ownership 
concentration are 
more likely to 
conduct SEOs. 
11 
APPENDIX 2 
MARKET REACTION TO COMPANY’S SEOs 
1. Summary of Literature review on SEOs empirical studies in developed markets: 
No. Author Data Methodology Research objectives Results Interpretation 
1 Masulis and 
Korwa 
(1986) 
NYSE/AMEX 
1963-1980. 
1406 SEO cases. 
Event study 
To examine market 
reaction toward company 
SEO announcement 
Portfolio returns on 
announcement day: 
Issuance not 
accompanied by 
stock sold to 
manager: 
AAR = - 1.21% 
(***) 
Issuance 
accompanied by 
stock sold to 
manager: 
AAR = - 2.69% 
(***) 
A reduction in ownership of 
manager is negative 
information about company 
current value to the market. 
2 Dhatt (1996) Korean Stock 
market 
1977-1991 
791 right 
distributions 
Buy and Hold Examine stock prices 
respond to right 
distributions in Korean 
stock market. 
     = 2.41% (**) The high volume of the SEOs 
will reduce the level of 
liability in a company then 
reduce the cost of financial 
distress; the better the 
company is, the higher the 
SEOs issuance price it offers. 
3 Jung et al. 
(1996) 
USA 1977-1984 
192 SEO cases 
Market 
model 
Investigating the pecking 
order model, the agency 
model, and the timing 
model power in explaining 
    ; = - 2.70% (*) Company with high agency 
cost will conduct SEO if they 
have poor investment 
opportunities. 
12 
company financing 
decisions and stock price 
reaction to their decisions. 
4 Tsangarakis 
(1996) 
Athens Stock 
Exchange 
1981-1990. 
111 SEOs cases. 
Event study Examine stock price 
reaction toward company 
SEO in Athens Stock 
Market. 
      ; = 
0.02451(***) 
SEOs increase the capital in 
the company, increase the 
ownership of big investors 
then reduce the agency cost; at 
announcement day the level of 
information asymmetry is at 
low level. 
5 Slovin et al. 
(2000) 
London Stock 
Market 1986 – 
1994. 
220 right 
distributions and 
76 private 
placements. 
Market 
model 
Measure influences of SEO 
announcement and issuance 
method on stock returns at 
UK market. 
Abnormal returns [-
1;0] with 0 is 
announcement day = 
-3.09%*** 
Market expects that managers 
will conduct SEOs when stock 
price of company is 
overvalued or company cash 
flow is below its expectation 
6 Tan et al. 
(2002) 
SGX 1987- 1996 . 
56 companies (65 
right distributions 
and 67 private 
placement) 
Event study Examine stock price 
response to SEO 
announcement at Singapore 
market. 
     ;  = 1.649% 
** 
Company conducted SEOS 
after a period of stock price 
increasing; there is a trend of 
information leaked before the 
announcement day that enable 
speculators to achieve high 
returns. 
7 Rezaul Kabir 
et. al. (2002) 
Amsterdam 
Exchanges 1/1984 
– 12/1995. 76 
industrial 
Event study Examine the impact of 
stock valuation to 
subsequent company 
performance. 
    ; = - 2.79%**. Equity rights issue is 
considered negative news to 
the market. 
13 
companies in 
Netherlands. 
8 Lee (2007) US 1980-1988. 
864 SEO cases. 
Market 
model 
Evaluate stock price 
reaction to company SEO 
announcement by internal 
trading. 
    , : - 2.13%*** Returns on announcement day 
reduce in a larger scale when 
information about company 
net selling than net buying 
available 
9 Walker et al. 
(2008) 
Thomson 
Financial’s 
Corporate New 
Issues data stream 
- US 1997-2000. 
438 companies. 
Market 
model 
Examine the ex-ante 
purpose of capital using of 
company and how market 
reacts to that information. 
    ;  = - 2.76% 
The more specific plan on the 
use of funding will lead to 
better market reaction. 
10 Balachandran 
(2008) 
London stock 
exchange 
1996- 2005. 
1001 SEO cases 
Event study Investigate how the market 
react to SEOs 
announcement, and 
determinations of issuing 
type 
    ; = - 1.59%*** Companies signal their quality 
by offering lower issued price 
discounts; lower risk and the 
use of share pre-renouncement 
11 R. Aggarwal 
et. al.(2008) 
US 1983 – 2003. 
8127 SEO cases 
Regression 
model 
Point out the reason why 
SEO announcement leads 
to significantly negatively 
market reaction. 
   = - 1.7% 
Added shares increase market 
selling pressure. 
12 Owen and 
Suchard 
(2008) 
Australian Stock 
market 1993 – 
2001. 
207 right 
distributions. 
OLS 
regression 
Investigate abnormal 
returns resulting from the 
announcement of a rights 
issue of equity in Australia 
    = - 0.77%** 
    ;  = - 
1.83%*** 
SEO announcement conveys 
negative information about 
company profit or investment 
opportunities. 
Companies which expect their 
stock price decrease in 
issuance period will self-
14 
defend by offering a relative 
low price to encourage 
investors to join the issuance. 
13 Chikolwa 
(2009) 
S&P/ASX 300 
Index 2000-2008. 
277 SEO cases 
Event study Examines the SEOs 
decision by Australian 
Real Estate Trusts and 
how the market react to the 
offerings 
 ASAR0= - 0.564%* 
SEOs increase price pressure, 
lead to wealth transfer from 
shareholders to creditors, and 
information about capital 
raising shows negative signal 
about company current cash 
flow. 
14 Eric Duca 
(2011) 
US 1980-2007. 
2420 SEO cases 
OLS 
regression 
Examine effect of choosing 
market timing on stock 
returns after SEO. 
SEO following 
another SEO: 
CAR  ;  = - 0.020 
SEO following IPO 
     ;  = - 0.026 
Company will choose market 
timing to conduct SEOs; 
investors, on another hand, 
tend to adjust stock price to 
respond to this information, 
company will compensate for 
investors by offering a relative 
low price in the next SEOs. 
15 Fu et al. 
(2012) 
US 1985- 2010. 
6645 SEO cases 
Regression 
model 
To verify results of prior 
studies that the years 
following share 
repurchases will generate 
high stock AR while the 
year following SEOs will 
lead to low stock AR. 
     , = - 2.77% 
*** 
Because the efficiency of the 
market is improved gradually, 
fewer firms will exploit the 
market timing to repurchase 
stocks and offer SEOs. 
15 
2. Summary of Literature review on SEOs empirical studies in emerging markets: 
No. Authors Data Methodology Research objectives Results Interpretation 
1 Salamudin 
et. al.(1999) 
Malaysia stock 
market 1/1980-
12/1995. 
255 right 
distributions 
Event study 
Examine stock price reaction 
toward company’s right 
distributions 
Favorable market 
timing: 
    = 0.003 
Unfavorable market 
timing: 
    = -0.0083 
Investors expect that 
money derived from the 
issuance will be used to 
finance for profitable 
projects at potentially 
developing countries 
with high economic 
growth. 
2 Cahit 
Adaoglu 
(2006) 
Istanbul Stock 
Exchange 1994-
1999. 
294 right 
distributions 
Market 
model 
Examine how the Istanbul 
market reacts to plain and 
simultaneous distribution of 
bonus issues rights. 
Unsweetened: 
AR0 = −0.02107** 
Sweetened: 
AR0 = 0.00489 
The AR for 
unsweetened rights is 
significant negative 
since they convey 
unfavorable information 
about company 
activities. On the other 
hand, the sweetened 
rights offerings lead to 
positive AR. 
3 Marisetty et 
al. (2008) 
Indian capital 
market 1997–
2005 
203 right 
distributions 
1 factor 
Market 
model 
Examines securities price 
reaction to announcements 
of rights issues by listed 
Indian firms during the 
period 1997–2005. 
Rights issues with 
warrants, 
preference shares 
or convertible 
notes: 
    ,   = 0.0003 
Right issues only: 
    ,   = 0.0037 
SEO under right 
distribution method will 
increase cash resources 
and financial liquidity 
in company. 
4 C. Chen, X. Chinese stock Event study Examines stock price CAR  ,   Right distributions 
16 
Chen (2007) market 1999 – 
2001. 
205 SEOs 
reaction to right 
distributions. 
1999 = - 0.010** 
2000 = - 0.004 
2001 = - 0.017*** 
increase price pressure 
on stocks. 
5 Humera 
Shahid 
(2010) 
Shanghai and 
Shenzhen stock 
Exchange 1998-
2008. 
717 SEOs 
Market 
returns 
adjusted 
model and 
Average 
returns 
adjusted 
model 
Examine stock price reaction 
to SEO announcements at 
Chinese stock market 
Right distribution : 
   = - 0.0018 
Managers conduct 
SEOs when company’s 
stock price is 
overvalued; investors, 
then, tend to reevaluate 
company’s current 
stock prices on the 
market. 
6 Leskullawat 
(2011) 
Thailand Stock 
market 1999-
2006. 
1910 SEOs 
Event study 
OLS 
regression 
Research on SEOs of 
Thailand firms from 1999 to 
2006 
   = -0.01069*** 
SEOs increase price 
pressure on company’s 
stocks. 
(Source: author’s recapitulation) 
17 
APPENDIX 3 
DETERMINANTS OF MARKET REACTION TO COMPANY’S SEOS 
1. Summary of Literature review on SEOs empirical studies in developed markets: 
No. Author Financial theory Proxies 
1 Masulis 
(1986) 
- Signaling model 
- Optimal capital structure 
model 
- Adverse selection model 
- Agency theory 
- Other controlling 
variables (RUNUP; 
MRUNUP; D2; D3; D4) 
- ΔSHR: the percentage change in the shares of common stock outstanding 
- ΔLEV: the changes in the firm's financial leverage 
- VAR: the stock's total risk measured by the variance of the stock's return over 
the 60 trading days preceding the announcement period 
- D1: whether the secondary offering component of a combination offering 
involves management share sales, measured by an indicator variable 
- RUNUP: the common stock's price runup over the pre-announcement three-
month period as measured by its cumulative return 
- MRUNUP: the price runup in the CRSP equally weighted stock market index 
over the three-month pre-announcement period as measured by its cumulative 
return 
- D2: whether or not the firm had made one or more common stock offerings in 
the previous year 
- D3: whether or not the firm had sought and obtained additional common stock 
authorization in the year preceding the offering announcement, 
- D4: whether or not the firm's leverage ratio at the yearend preceding the 
offering is greater than the average leverage ratio over the prior four fiscal year 
ends 
2 Jung et al. 
(1996) 
- Taxation 
- Cost of financial 
distress 
- Growth opportunities 
- Cost of financial 
distress 
- Asymmetric 
information 
- Others [Gross 
proceeds/MVCS; Log 
- Tax payment/TA: tax/book value of total assets 
- Long-term debt/TA: : long-term debt/ book value of total assets 
- Market-to-book: market value / book value of total assets 
- Cash flow: (operating income before depreciation – tax – gross interest expense 
– dividend paid on common and preferred stock)/ book value of total assets 
- Stock return volatility: CRSP daily data for the period [-240;-40] 
- 6-month leading indicator 
- Past 11-month cumulative excess return 
- Cash and liquid/ total assets 
- Total assets: total assets 
18 
of (Amount/MVCS)] - Post-issue 5-year excess returns: excess return of issuing firms over firms with 
similar size before the issue 
- Gross proceeds/MVCS: proceeds from the issue/market value of equity) 
- Log of (Amount/MVCS): log of ( proceeds from the issue/market value of 
equity) 
3 Lee (2007) - Information asymmetry 
- Price pressure 
- Agency cost 
- Information asymmetry 
- Control variables 
[RUNUP; Df; D1; D2]: 
- NTRD: insider trading activity within 10 day before announcement day = net 
insider trading/outstanding shares. 
- FSIZE: logarithm of company shares before announcement day 
- ISIZE: issuance size = proceeds from the issuance/company share value before 
announcement day. 
- OWNR: shares owned by insider investors/outstanding shares 
- LEVC: change in company leverage 
- RUNUP: cumulative stock return in the period of 60 days before announcement 
day 
- Df: dummy variable : times to conduct SEOs in a year 
- D1, D2: industry dummy variables 
4 Walker 
(2008) 
- Information asymmetry 
- Growth opportunity 
- Operating cash flow 
- Level of leverage 
- Level of liquidity 
- Level of investment 
- Pecking order theory 
- Market timing 
- (Stated INV)/TA-1: the amounts of capital to be used for investment/Total 
assets 
- (Stated GEN)/TA-1: the amounts of capital to be used for general corporate 
purposes /Total assets 
- (Stated DEBT)/TA-1: the amounts of capital to be used for debt repayment 
/Total assets 
- (INV+1–INV-1)/TA-1*INVEST_FIRM:(change in capital expenditures + 
R&D)/Total assets for Invest firms 
- (INV+1–INV-1)/TA-1*GENERAL_FIRM:(change in capital expenditures + 
R&D)/Total assets for General firms 
- (INV+1–INV-1)/TA-1*DEBT_FIRM:(change in capital 
expenditures+R&D)/Total assets for debt firms 
INVEST FIRM and GENERAL FIRM are indicator variables equal to one if the 
firm is categorized as an INVEST firm or as a GENERAL firm, respectively; 
otherwise equal to 0. 
- (LTD+1 – LTD-1)/TA-1: change in long-term debt/Total assets 
- (WC+1 – WC-1)/TA-1: change in working capital/Total assets 
19 
- Q-1: (market value of equity − book value of equity+book value of assets)/book 
value of assets 
- OBID-1/TA-1: operating income before depreciation/total assets 
- PPE-1/TA-1: plant, property and equipment/total assets 
- LN(TA-1): ln of total assets 
- RUNUP: market- adjusted abnormal returns from day −61 to −2, where day 0 
is the announcement date 
- SECONDARY: indicator that equals one if the SEO includes some secondary 
shares, otherwise equal to 0 
5 R. Aggarwal, 
X. Zhao 
(2008) 
 Growth opportunity 
 Liquidity 
 Information asymmetry 
 Growth opportunity 
 Others (Size, ∆Leverage ; 
∆Volatility) 
- MB: ratio of market value of total assets to book value of total assets 
- Offer Size: ratio of shares issued to the number of shares outstanding before 
the issuance date 
- Turnover: total trading volume during the period [−1, 1] as a proportion of the 
total number of shares outstanding in day −1 
- Analyst Coverage: average number of analysts making monthly forecast of 1-
year-ahead earnings per share within a twelve-month period 
- Dispersion: standard deviation of the earnings forecast scaled by the absolute 
value of the mean earnings forecast. 
- Price Run-up: annualized return during the 125 days before SEO announcement 
- Size: Log of market capitalization 
- ∆Leverage: difference between total market leverage after issuance and before 
issuance 
- ∆Volatility: annualized returns volatilities estimated using 125 daily returns 
data before SEO announcement. 
6 M.S. Officer 
(2011) 
- Growth opportunity 
- Cash flow signaling 
hypothesis 
- Agency cost 
- Firm’s characteristics 
[Log(Size); Dividend 
yield; Δrisk; Prior 
repurchases; ROA; 
RE/TE] 
- Q: (total assets + fiscal-year-end market value of equity - book value of equity - 
balance sheet deferred taxes)/total assets 
- Low Q: indicator variable equal to one if the initiating firm's Q is less than or 
equal to the industry/year median 
- Cash flow from operations (industry adjusted): (earnings before extraordinary 
items + depreciation and amortization - working capital accruals)/ total assets 
- Low Q * Cash flow from operations (industry adjusted) 
- Log(Size): log of market value of equity 
- Dividend yield: mount of the initial dividend divided by the stock price three 
20 
trading days prior to the dividend initiation announcement date 
- Δrisk: change in the risk premium after the announcement of a dividend 
initiation. 
- Prior repurchases: indicator variable equal to one if the initiating firm 
repurchases stock in the five years prior to the dividend initiation, and zero 
otherwise. 
- ROA 
- RE/TE: retained earnings/book value of equity 
7 Eric Duca 
(2011) 
- Market timing 
- Information asymmetry 
- Growth opportunity 
- Information asymmetry 
- Financial constrain 
- Others (Age; Years 
previous issue; 
Previous debt issue; 
Previous underpricing; 
IPO underpricing; 
Inverse Mills' ratio) 
- 6 Mth. post-previous rets. (12 Mth. post-previous rets.): buy-and-hold returs in 
the period of 6 months (12 months) after previous SEO. 
- 6 Mth. post-IPO rets. (12 Mth. post-IPO rets.): buy-and-hold returs in the 
period of 6 months (12 months) after previous IPO. 
- Abn. Stock return: monthly stock return – market return 
- Residual volatility: annualized standard deviation of residuals from a regression 
of daily excess stock returns on excess returns of the value-weighted CRSP 
market portfolio, estimated over trading days -62 to -2 before the announcement 
date. 
Systematic volatility: annualized standard deviation of the predicted value from 
a regression of daily excess stock returns on excess returns of the value -
weighted CRSP market portfolio, estimated over trading days -62 to -2 before 
the announcement date. 
- Slack: Cash and short term investments/total assets 
- Fixed assets 
- Ln(Sales): logarithm of sale 
- Taxes: tax/total assets 
- Tobin's Q 
- R&D expense 
- Leverage-Target: the deviation of the market leverage from the target leverage 
- KZ index: Kaplan and Zingales index 
- Age: difference, in years, between the issue date and the date that the firm first 
appears in the CRSP database 
- Years previous issue: the number of years that have elapsed since the previous 
issue 
21 
 - Previous debt issue: dummy variable for issuers that make a debt issue in 
between the current SEO and a previous equity offering. 
- Previous underpricing: logarithm (closing price of day before announcement 
day/price of announcement day) 
- IPO underpricing: 
- Inverse Mills' ratio 
8 Fu et al. 
(2012) 
- Market timing 
- Market timing 
- Others: [Cash/Assets; 
Debt/Assets; 
EBITDA/Assets; 
Return volatility; 3-year 
CAPX/Assets; 
Proceeds/ME; Industry 
dummy; Post 2002 
dummy; Log (Assets)] 
- Prior 12 - month returns: the compound return in the 12 months before the 
announcement 
- B/M: book to market equity ratio 
- Cash/Assets: cash and marketable securities/total assets 
- Debt/Assets: long-term debt/total assets 
- EBITDA/Assets: BITDA/total assets 
- Return volatility: (standard deviation of daily returns in the previous 12 
months 
- 3-year CAPX/Assets: sum of capital expenditures in the following three years 
divide d by total assets 
- Proceeds/ME:(transaction value scaled by market capitalization before 
announcement 
- Industry dummy 
- Log (Assets): Log (Total assets) 
22 
9 Balachandran 
(2008) 
- Quality signaling 
hypothesis 
- Growth opportunity 
- Information asymmetry 
- Ownership 
Concentration company 
quality 
- Leverage 
- Issuance size 
- DISC: the subscription price discount; 
- BM: book-to-market ratio measured as book value of assets to market value of 
assets; 
- LMV: logarithm of the market value of the i issuing firm one month prior to the 
announcement 
- IDYRISK: idiosyncratic risk measured as the standard error of the market 
model regression of daily stock returns over the period from day -260 to day -61 
for each issuing company 
- BH5: blockholders holding shares of 5% of more; 
- DUW: dummy variable equal to 1 if the issue is fully underwritten, and zero 
otherwise 
- RUNUP: raw return for the one-year period prior to the announcement date 
(return from -260 to day -2); 
- TD/TA: total debt to total assets; 
- LOP: natural logarithm of the offer proceeds; 
- LOPtoMV: natural logarithm of the ratio of offer proceeds to market value one 
month before the announcement date 
10 Owen and 
Suchard 
(2008) 
- Information 
asymmetry. 
- Growth opportunity 
- Agency cost 
- Industry dummy 
- The use of proceeds 
- 
- ISSUE: gross proceeds of the issue as a percentage of the market value of the 
firm 
- FIRM: log of total assets 
- VOL: standard deviation of daily stock returns in the year prior to the 
announcement 
- CONCENTRATION: the percentage shareholding of the top 20 shareholders 
prior to the announcement 
- RENOUNCE: Dummy variable =1 if an issue is renounceable 
- PREDISC: Predicted discount price 
- GO: Book value of equity / market value equity 
- UWCOST: underwriting fee as a percentage of the offer proceeds 
- RANK: takes the value of one if the underwriter of the issue appears in the top 
10 underwriters as reported by Thomson Financials’ rankings in the calendar 
year prior to the rights issue announcement 
- INSTIT: percentage of shares owned by institutions prior to the announcement 
date. 
23 
- RUNUP: cumulative excess return over the period (-60,-1). 
- LEVERAGE: post-announcement debt to equity ratio over the pre-
announcement debt to equity ratio. 
- MGT: percentage ownership of managers at the yearend before the 
announcement 
- RESOURCE: equal to 1 if the issuer is a resource firm and zero otherwise 
- RETIREDEBT: equals one if the issue is used to retire debt 
- UW: equals one if the issue is used for working capital purposes 
11 Chikolwa 
(2009) 
- Price pressure 
hypothesis 
- Wealth effects 
hypothesis 
- Profitability 
- investment opportunity 
hypothesis 
- Risk 
- Information asymmetry 
hypothesis 
- Industry dummy 
- ERD: natural log of AU$ millions of seasoned equity raised 
- LTA: the ratio of total liability to total assets 
- ROA: return on assets 
- TOQ: ratio of the market value of equity plus the book value of debt to 
the book value of assets 
- PPT: ratio of book value of property to total assets 
- SDE: standard deviation of EBIT scaled by total assets for each firm over the 
entire period covered 
- SIZ: natural logarithm of total assets 
- DUMp,i: dummy variable for property sector 
- DUMs,i: dummy variable for stapled management structure. 
- DUMI,i: dummy variable for international operations 
12 Tan et al. 
(2002) 
- Price pressure effects 
- Investment opportunity 
effect 
- Wealth transfer effects 
- Pricing effects 
- Information asymmetry 
effects 
- Ownership structure 
effects 
- LIQ: ratio of the firm’s average daily trading volume from t=-200 to t=0, to the 
number of shares outstanding before the seasoned equity issue 
- VAR: variance of daily stock returns from day t=-200 to t=0 
- LnProvMV: natural logarithm of the ratio of the proceeds to the market 
value of the firm on day t=-30 
- INV: the announcement of investment opportunities and/or capital expenditure. 
INV is set equal to 1 announcement of investment opportunities and/or 
capital expenditure, equal to 0 when the issuing firms announce that the 
issuance proceeds will be used for repayment of debt or financing working 
capital needs 
- ΔDE: change in the issuing firm’s debt-to-equity ratio 
- PRC: ratio of the offer price to the closing price of the share on day 
t=30 
24 
(Source: author’s recapitulation) 
2. Summary of Literature review on SEOs empirical studies in emerging markets: 
No. Authors Financial theory Proxies 
1 Tsangarakis 
(1996) 
- Investment 
opportunity 
- Price pressure 
- Signaling theory 
- Information 
asymmetry 
- 
- Liquidity 
- Market timing 
- Ownership dummy 
- INVEST: increased capital. 
- SIZE: stock volume after issuance. 
- VAR: variance of stock returns. 
- OFFER: issuance price. 
- DTOA: dummy variable, equal to 1 if ratio of debt/total assets of 
company is below median of sample’s ratio of debt/total assets. 
- CONTR: measure the dispersion of company’s ownership. 
- LIQUID: liquidity of stocks. 
- MARKET: cumulative market returns in the period [-50;-1] before 
announcement day. 
- S-P: dummy variable, equal to 1 if company is stated-owned companies. 
- B-R: dummy variable, equal to 1 if investors do not have to subscript to 
- BM: book-to-market-equity ratio on day t=-30 
- ΔOL: difference between the level of ownership concentration before and after 
the private placement 
13 Rezaul Kabir 
(2002) 
- Information asymmetry 
hypothesis 
- Free cash flows 
hypothesis 
- Window of opportunity 
hypothesis 
- Issue-size: relative to the market value of equity on the day before the 
announcement. 
- Isues-price: relative to the closing stock price of one day and three days before 
the issue announcement as well as the average of closing stock prices for ten 
days before the announcement 
- M/B: sum of market value of equity and book value of debt divided by book 
value of total assets 
- GDP: dummy variable set to 1 if the issue occurs in years of relatively high 
growth rate of GDP 
25 
own new issued shares. 
2 Dhatt (1996) - Signaling theory 
- Information 
asymmetry 
- Price pressure 
Company prospect 
- LMVE: log of the market value of equity at the end of the fiscal year 
before the announcement 
- PCEDR: percentage change in the ratio of market value of equity to book 
value of debt during the rights issue year 
- PERSIZ: number of shares offered in the rights issue divided by number 
of shares outstanding before the offer 
- PERPRI: subscription price divided by the stock's market price one 
month before the announcement 
3 Salamudin 
et. al.(1999) 
- Information 
asymmetry 
- Price pressure 
hypothesis 
- Growth opportunities 
- Economic condition 
Market timing 
- SDAR: standard deviation of abnormal returns for days t=-60 to t=-9 
- ROFFER: ratio of offer price to average 20 days pre-announcement price 
- LVOL: gross amount of funds raised at offering, in logarithmic 
specification. 
- RINV: relative investment given by ratio of funds allocated for 
investment and working capital purposes to gross amount of funds raised. 
- TOBINQ: market value of equity plus book value of debt divided by 
book value of total assets 
- ROA: gross profits divided by total assets 
- ECON: a dichotomous variable, which takes on the value 1 for issues 
made during periods of declining risk premium and 0 otherwise 
- MRUNUP: 60 days pre-announcement market returns 
5 Leskullawat 
(2011) 
- Information 
asymmetry 
- Growth opportunity 
- Leverage 
- Company 
performance 
- Ownership 
Others (P/E; TURN; 
- SIZE: The ratio of market capitalization 
- M/B: The change in market to book ratio is defined as the difference in 
the market to book ratio in the year of issuing and the average 3 years of 
this ratio before the year of offering 
- LEVERAGE: difference between leverage ratio in the year of issuing 
and average leverage ratio 3 years before the issue year 
- The difference between ROA, ROE or EBITDA in the offering 
year and average ROA, ROE or EBITDA for 3 years before the year 
of offering 
26 
EVENT) - OWN: difference between the top five largest major shareholders in 
the year of offering and the top five largest major shareholders 3 
years before the issuing year 
- P/E: P/E ratio in the issued year minus average P/E ratio 3 years before 
the issuing year 
- TURN: ratio that measures trading volume in comparison to the 
number of shares outstanding 
- EVENT: refer to events other than SEOs during the period of 115 
days before and after the SEO announcement (day 0) 
6 Hong Bo et 
al. (2011) 
- Financing for 
investment and 
growth 
- The tradeoff theory 
Market timing 
- Agency theory 
- Control variables 
Industry dummy 
- Growth: annual growth rate of sale. 
- Investment: annual growth rate of fixed investment 
- Tradeoff: difference between the firm i’s leverage and the average 
leverage of other firms in the same industry 
- Overvalue: difference between the firm i’s MB and the average MB of all 
other firms 
- EAE: difference between the firm i’s administrative expenses and the 
average administrative expenses of all other firms in the same industry 
- Nontradable: ratio of non-tradable shareholdings to total shares 
outstanding 
- Size: logarithm of total assets 
- Profit: earnings before interests and tax scaled by total assets 
- Debt: ratio of total debt to total assets 
- Volatility: difference between the standard deviation of the firm i’s daily 
stock returns and the average standard deviation of daily stock returns of 
other firms in the same industry 
- Gap: number of years between the last and the current SEOs. 
- Next: takes the value of one if the firm has another SEOs in 3 years 
subsequent to the current SEOs 
- Industry: industry dummy 
7 Dasilas, S. Dividend signaling - BETA : systematic risk using data in the pre-event (estimation) period. 
27 
Leventis 
(2011) 
model - DY : ratio of dividend for the year over the price one day prior to 
dividend announcement. 
- 	SIZE : logarithm of market capitalization one day prior to the 
announcement day. 
- NV : logarithm of normal volume in the estimation period 
- %D : percentage change between the current and the previous dividend 
- PREAV : abnormal trading volume as a percentage of the average trading 
volume during the pre-announcement period. 
- DDUMMY : variable to indicate if the firms' dividend payment is below 
or above the minimum. 
- YEARS : dummy to control for year effects 
(Source: author’s recapitulation) 
28 
APPENDIX 4 
DETERMINANTS OF MARKET REACTION TO COMPANY’S SEOs BY RANDOM EFFECTS 
AND FIXED EFFECT MODEL 
1. Determinants of market reaction around SEO announcement day 
Determinants of market reaction around announcement day: panel data Random effects, Fixed effects estimation. This table presents results of 
regression on cumulative average abnormal return CAR[0;+2]. The sample period is from 2007 to 2013. The dependent variable is cumulative 
abnormal return in the period [0;+2]. TobinQ is measured as (Market value of stock + Book value of debt)/Book value of total assets; Mrunup indicates 
Market cumulative abnormal returns (VNIndex) in the period runs from day -65 to day -16, where day 0 is the announcement day; DA indicates Total 
debt/Total asset; Issuesize denotes Logarithm of the volume of stock issued; Firmsize is Logarithm of total assets; Industry effect and issue method 
effect are controlled by adding industry dummy (REC takes value 1 if SEOs issued company is listed in Real estate and construction group and takes 
value 0 otherwise, MAI takes value 1 if SEOs issued company is listed in Manufacturing industry group and takes value 0 otherwise, SER takes value 
1 if SEOs issued company is listed in Service group and takes value 0 otherwise, FBI takes value 1 if SEOs issued company is listed in Financial – 
banking – Insurance services and takes value 0 otherwise, AFF takes value 1 if SEOs issued company is listed in Agriculture – Fishery – Forestry 
group and takes value 0 otherwise); and issue method dummies; RMH indicates ratio of managerial holding include the board of directors, board of 
supervisor, president and CEO/Total outstanding shares; t-statistics are in parentheses; *** Statistically significant at the 1% level; ** Statistically 
significant at the 5% level; * Statistically significant at 10% level. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Random effects Fixed effects Random effects Fixed effects Random effects Fixed effects 
CAR Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
TobinQ 0.001 
(0.69) 
0.006 
(1.50) 
0.000 
(0.36) 
0.004 
(1.06) 
Mrunup 
0.052 
(4.59)*** 
0.055 
(3.64)*** 
0.052 
(4.55)*** 
0.053 
(3.46)*** 
DA -0.004 -0.057 -0.002 -0.029 -0.002 -0.040 
29 
(-0.31) (-1.83)* (-0.13) (-1.01) (-0.14) (-1.30) 
Issuesize 0.002 
(0.29) 
0.005 
(0.50) 
0.001 
(0.21) 
0.003 
(0.32) 
0.000 
(0.15) 
0.003 
(0.31) 
Firmsize -0.011 
(-1.66)* 
0.024 
(0.99) 
-0.012 
(-1.79)* 
-0.003 
(-0.15) 
-0.011 
(-1.66)* 
0.014 
(0.58) 
Industry 
2 0.002 
(0.39) 
-0.041 
(-1.15) 
0.004 
(0.65) 
-0.031 
(-0.90) 
0.004 
(0.63) 
-0.034 
(-0.98) 
3 0.005 
(0.66) 
-0.031 
(-0.71) 
0.005 
(0.74) 
-0.018 
(-0.42) 
0.005 
(0.75) 
-0.021 
(-0.49) 
4 0.023 
(1.54) 
(omitted) 
0.027 
(1.64) 
(omitted) 
0.026 
(1.59) 
(omitted) 
5 0.019 
(0.97) 
(omitted) 
0.019 
(0.95) 
(omitted) 
0.019 
(0.94) 
(omitted) 
Issuemethod -0.011 
(-2.29)** 
0.004 
(0.43) 
-0.010 
(-2.18)** 
0.003 
(0.41) 
-0.011 
(-2.20)** 
0.003 
(0.39) 
RMH 0.000 
(0.84) 
0.000 
(0.26) 
0.000 
(0.97) 
0.000 
(0.20) 
0.000 
(0.99) 
0.000 
(0.21) 
Cons 0.094 
(2.48)** 
-0.167 
(-0.95) 
0.101 
(2.70)** 
0.045 
(0.37) 
0.097 
(2.57)** 
-0.083 
(-0.48) 
Prob > chi2 0.1279 0.0001 0.0002 
Prob > F 0.6274 0.0309 0.0350 
Hausman test -11.58 -8.30 -9.40 
30 
Obs. 565 565 565 565 565 565 
* Significant at 10% level, ** Significant at 5% level, *** Significant at 1% level 
(Source: authors’ calculations) 
2. Determinants of market reaction around SEOs ex-right day: 
Determinants of market reaction around ex-right day: panel data Random effects, Fixed effects estimation. This table presents results of regression on 
cumulative average abnormal return on CAR[0;+2]. The sample period is from 2007 to 2013. The dependent variable is cumulative abnormal return in 
the period [0;+2]. TobinQ is measured as (Market value of stock + Book value of debt)/Book value of total assets; Mrunup indicates Market 
cumulative abnormal returns (VNIndex) in the period runs from day -65 to day -16, where day 0 is the announcement day; DA indicates Total 
debt/Total asset; Issuesize denotes Logarithm of the volume of stock issued; Firmsize is Logarithm of total assets; Industry effect and issue method 
effect are controlled by adding industry dummy (REC takes value 1 if SEOs issued company is listed in Real estate and construction group and takes 
value 0 otherwise, MAI takes value 1 if SEOs issued company is listed in Manufacturing industry group and takes value 0 otherwise, SER takes value 
1 if SEOs issued company is listed in Service group and takes value 0 otherwise, FBI takes value 1 if SEOs issued company is listed in Financial – 
banking – Insurance services and takes value 0 otherwise, AFF takes value 1 if SEOs issued company is listed in Agriculture – Fishery – Forestry 
group and takes value 0 otherwise); and issue method dummies; RMH indicates ratio of managerial holding include the board of directors, board of 
supervisor, president and CEO/Total outstanding shares; t-statistics are in parentheses; *** Statistically significant at the 1% level; ** Statistically 
significant at the 5% level; * Statistically significant at 10% level. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Random effects Fixed effects Random effects Fixed effects Random effects Fixed effects 
CAR Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
TobinQ 0.003 
(2.38)** 
-0.004 
(-0.84) 
0.003 
(2.34)** 
-0.004 
(-0.86) 
31 
Mrunup 
0.008 
(0.50) 
0.005 
(0.23) 
0.005 
(0.30) 
0.007 
(0.32) 
DA 0.016 
(1.04) 
0.009 
(0.21) 
0.016 
(1.02) 
-0.002 
(-0.05) 
0.016 
(1.04) 
0.009 
(0.21) 
Issuesize 0.021 
(3.64)*** 
0.039 
(3.40)*** 
0.023 
(4.09)*** 
0.037 
(3.30)*** 
0.021 
(3.63)*** 
0.039 
(3.41)*** 
Firmsize -0.022 
(-2.99)*** 
-0.098 
(-3.02)*** 
-0.025 
(-3.52)*** 
-0.079 
(-3.30)*** 
-0.022 
(-2.99)*** 
-0.099 
(-3.03)*** 
Industry 
2 -0.017 
(-2.14)** 
-0.012 
(-0.95) 
-0.016 
(-2.01)** 
-0.011 
(-0.89) 
-0.017 
(-2.11)** 
-0.011 
(-0.90) 
3 -0.009 
(-0.99) 
-0.013 
(-0.91) 
-0.008 
(-0.97) 
-0.013 
(-0.88) 
-0.008 
(-0.97) 
-0.013 
(-0.87) 
4 -0.013 
(-0.87) 
0.005 
(0.20) 
-0.011 
(-0.78) 
0.004 
(0.18) 
-0.013 
(-0.86) 
0.005 
(0.22) 
5 -0.011 
(-0.45) 
-0.024 
(-0.54) 
-0.005 
(-0.21) 
-0.026 
(-0.59) 
-0.011 
(-0.45) 
-0.023 
(-0.52) 
Issuemethod 0.010 
(1.56) 
0.007 
(0.71) 
0.011 
(1.61) 
0.008 
(0.76) 
0.010 
(1.56) 
0.007 
(0.71) 
RMH -0.000 
(-0.28) 
0.000 
(0.16) 
-0.000 
(-0.50) 
0.001 
(0.36) 
-0.000 
(-0.26) 
0.000 
(0.14) 
Cons 0.040 
(1.03) 
0.510 
(2.15)** 
0.056 
(1.45) 
0.375 
(2.17)** 
0.040 
(1.03) 
0.517 
(2.17)** 
32 
Prob > chi2 0.0001 0.0008 0.0002 
Prob > F 0.0237 0.0293 0.0365 
Hausman test -10.72 -9.72 -10.78 
Obs. 575 575 575 575 575 575 
* Significant at 10% level, ** Significant at 5% level, *** Significant at 1% level 
(Source: authors’ calculations)