Luận án Nghiên cứu các nhân tố tác động đến hành vi điều chỉnh lợi nhuận tại các công ty phi tài chính niêm yết trên thị trường chứng khoán Việt Nam

Hiện nay quản trị công ty ở Việt Nam đã được các doanh nghiệp chú ý thể hiện ở việc có các tổ chức hỗ trợ doanh nghiệp cải thiện chất lượng quản trị công ty cũng như hỗ trợ các cơ quan quản lý trong việc ban hành chính sách, luật Điều này chứng tỏ, các doanh nghiệp Việt Nam đang dần hoàn thiện cơ chế quản trị công ty của mình vì mục tiêu phát triển không những trong phạm vi quốc gia mà còn hội nhập được với thế giới Kết quả nghiên cứu cho thấy nếu công ty được kiểm toán bởi Big 4 thì sẽ hạn chế được ĐCLN. Tuy vậy số lượng các công ty được kiểm toán bởi Big 4 là rất ít (chỉ khoảng 22% trong khi các quốc gia khác lên tới 50% - 80% do đó các doanh nghiệp cần chú ý lựa chọn các đơn vị kiểm toán lớn và có uy tín để đảm bảo thông tin cung cấp có chất lượng tốt. Tóm tại, những khuyến nghị có thể đưa ra đối với doanh nghiệp ở đây có thể là ở trên 2 góc độ chính: Thứ nhất, là về vấn đề đào tạo, doanh nghiệp cần không ngừng nâng cao trình độ chuyên môn và sự hiểu biết về vấn đề ĐCLN và tiếp theo sau là hỗ trợ công tác đào tạo để đội ngũ nhân viên có thể tiếp cận và sử dụng các mô hình, công cụ phát hiện ĐCLN từ đơn giản đến phức tạp nhằm hỗ trợ công tác phân tích và cung cấp thông tin ra bên ngoài. Thứ hai, là vấn đề vận dụng kết quả nghiên cứu để đưa ra các khuyến nghị cụ thể, từ những bằng chứng thực nghiệm, doanh nghiệp có cơ sở để đưa ra các hướng đi cụ thể từ việc tránh vi phạm tỷ lệ nợ cho phép, tránh lạm dụng vị thế của một công ty lớn cho đến việc củng cố chất lượng quản trị công ty, lựa chọn đơn vị kiểm toán nhằm hạn chế ĐCLN, đảm bảo sự tin cậy của thông tin cung cấp

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THỐNG KÊ MÔ TẢ CÁC BIẾN TRONG NGHIÊN CỨU (Phần 4.2.1) stats | DA BOARD IDV DUAL OWN1 OWN2 AUDIT DEBT PERF SIZE ---------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- mean | .0622665 5.488274 3.478424 .358818 25.34985 5.284867 .2209193 2.011072 .1199229 11.74471 max | 4.120416 11 10 1 96.72 88.69 1 18.08324 1.012039 13.95658 min | -5.525249 3 2 0 0 0 0 .3955182 -1.325104 10.0669 sd | .8035383 1.073705 1.18016 .4797662 25.1524 10.40599 .4149635 1.847667 .1606768 .6204424 p50 | .2203999 5 3 0 19.365 .3304412 0 1.461787 .118341 11.74503 N | 2132 2132 2132 2132 2132 2132 2132 2132 2132 2132 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2. MỐI QUAN HỆ TƯƠNG QUAN GIỮA CÁC BIẾN (Phần 4.2.2) Obs = 2.132 | DA BOARD IDV DUAL OWN1 OWN2 AUDIT DEBT PERF SIZE -------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ DA | 1.0000 BOARD | 0.1233 1.0000 IDV | 0.0712 0.6210 1.0000 DUAL | -0.0706 0.0296 -0.2420 1.0000 OWN1 | 0.0431 -0.1526 -0.1175 -0.1879 1.0000 OWN2 | 0.1134 0.2009 0.2159 -0.0331 -0.1002 1.0000 AUDIT | 0.2152 0.1243 0.1923 -0.1367 0.0349 0.2699 1.0000 DEBT | 0.1796 -0.0457 -0.1107 -0.0622 0.0850 -0.1476 0.0091 1.0000 PERF | 0.2156 0.0349 0.0093 0.0129 0.0711 0.0536 0.0383 -0.1418 1.0000 SIZE | 0.6421 0.2783 0.2214 -0.1319 -0.0050 0.2735 0.4756 0.2531 0.0653 1.0000 147 3. MÔ HÌNH HỒI QUY BÌNH PHƯƠNG BÉ NHẤT OLS (Phần 4.4.1) Source | SS df MS Number of obs = 2132 -------------+------------------------------ F( 9, 2122) = 201.53 Model | 634.08649 9 70.4540544 Prob > F = 0.0000 Residual | 741.844466 2122 .349596826 R-squared = 0.4608 -------------+------------------------------ Adj R-squared = 0.4586 Total | 1375.93096 2131 .645673841 Root MSE = .59127 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ DA | Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] -------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- BOARD | -.0258019 .0161086 -1.60 0.109 -.0573922 .0057885 IDV | -.0208132 .0150058 -1.39 0.166 -.0502407 .0086144 DUAL | .0055569 .0292596 0.19 0.849 -.0518236 .0629373 OWN1 | .0007673 .0005319 1.44 0.149 -.0002759 .0018104 OWN2 | -.0032745 .0013447 -2.44 0.015 -.0059114 -.0006375 AUDIT | -.2059982 .0360996 -5.71 0.000 -.2767926 -.1352038 DEBT | .006084 .0076073 0.80 0.424 -.0088345 .0210025 PERF | .8878292 .0813929 10.91 0.000 .7282109 1.047447 SIZE | .9144636 .0261281 35.00 0.000 .8632242 .965703 _cons | -10.54117 .2894896 -36.41 0.000 -11.10889 -9.973462 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 4. KIỂM ĐỊNH GIẢ THUYẾT HỒI QUY VỀ ĐA CỘNG TUYẾN (Phần 4.4.1.) Variable | VIF 1/VIF -------------+---------------------- IDV | 1.91 0.523102 BOARD | 1.82 0.548400 SIZE | 1.60 0.624259 AUDIT | 1.37 0.731069 DEBT | 1.20 0.830384 DUAL | 1.20 0.832508 OWN2 | 1.19 0.837907 OWN1 | 1.09 0.916470 PERF | 1.04 0.959190 -------------+---------------------- Mean VIF | 1.38 148 5. MÔ HÌNH HỒI QUY ẢNH HƯỞNG CỐ ĐỊNH FEM (Phần 4.4.2) Fixed-effects (within) regression Number of obs = 2132 Group variable: id Number of groups = 537 R-sq: within = 0.1462 Obs per group: min = 1 between = 0.4532 avg = 4.0 overall = 0.4059 max = 5 F(9,1586) = 30.17 corr(u_i, Xb) = 0.2466 Prob > F = 0.0000 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ DA | Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] -------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- BOARD | -.0257797 .0185788 -1.39 0.165 -.0622212 .0106619 IDV | -.0084032 .0166888 -0.50 0.615 -.0411375 .0243312 DUAL | .0197668 .0324891 0.61 0.543 -.0439594 .083493 OWN1 | .0010505 .0007839 1.34 0.180 -.0004871 .0025882 OWN2 | -.0024483 .0013689 -1.79 0.074 -.0051334 .0002368 AUDIT | -.1309692 .0430246 -3.04 0.002 -.2153603 -.0465781 DEBT | .0690443 .0113604 6.08 0.000 .0467613 .0913272 PERF | .9760595 .0699422 13.96 0.000 .8388706 1.113248 SIZE | .5007864 .094372 5.31 0.000 .3156795 .6858934 _cons | -5.896365 1.093089 -5.39 0.000 -8.040417 -3.752314 -------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- sigma_u | .65380941 sigma_e | .34406603 rho | .78312389 (fraction of variance due to u_i) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ F test that all u_i=0: F(536, 1586) = 8.73 Prob > F = 0.0000 6. KIỂM ĐỊNH GIẢ THIẾT HIỆP PHƯƠNG SAI KHÔNG ĐỒNG NHẤT (Phần 4.4.4) Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity in fixed effect regression model H0: sigma(i)^2 = sigma^2 for all i chi2 (537) = 5.1e+34 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 149 7. MÔ HÌNH HỒI QUY ẢNH HƯỞNG NGẪU NHIÊN REM (Phần 4.4.3) Random-effects GLS regression Number of obs = 2132 Group variable: id Number of groups = 537 R-sq: within = 0.1365 Obs per group: min = 1 between = 0.5232 avg = 4.0 overall = 0.4568 max = 5 Wald chi2(9) = 812.25 corr(u_i, X) = 0 (assumed) Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ DA | Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] -------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- BOARD | -.0272518 .0165416 -1.65 0.099 -.0596726 .0051691 IDV | -.0096035 .0149065 -0.64 0.519 -.0388198 .0196128 DUAL | .0133176 .0291125 0.46 0.647 -.0437418 .070377 OWN1 | .000835 .000636 1.31 0.189 -.0004115 .0020815 OWN2 | -.0031801 .0012389 -2.57 0.010 -.0056084 -.0007518 AUDIT | -.1486697 .0379038 -3.92 0.000 -.2229598 -.0743796 DEBT | .0351117 .0088739 3.96 0.000 .0177193 .0525042 PERF | .9355094 .0654295 14.30 0.000 .80727 1.063749 SIZE | .9014415 .0412103 21.87 0.000 .8206708 .9822122 _cons | -10.51444 .468759 -22.43 0.000 -11.43319 -9.595693 -------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- sigma_u | .54814452 sigma_e | .34406603 rho | .71736142 (fraction of variance due to u_i) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 8. KIỂM ĐỊNH LAGRANGIAN MULTIPLIER (Phần 4.4.3) Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects DA[id,t] = Xb + u[id] + e[id,t] Estimated results: | Var sd = sqrt(Var) ---------+----------------------------- DA | .6456738 .8035383 e | .1183814 .344066 u | .3004624 .5481445 Test: Var(u) = 0 chibar2(01) = 1013.29 Prob > chibar2 = 0.0000 150 9. KIỂM ĐỊNH HAUSMAN (Phần 4.4.4) ---- Coefficients ---- | (b) (B) (b-B) sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) | fe re Difference S.E. -------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- BOARD | -.0257797 -.0272518 .0014721 .0084585 IDV | -.0084032 -.0096035 .0012003 .007504 DUAL | .0197668 .0133176 .0064492 .0144225 OWN1 | .0010505 .000835 .0002155 .0004584 OWN2 | -.0024483 -.0031801 .0007318 .0005822 AUDIT | -.1309692 -.1486697 .0177005 .0203572 DEBT | .0690443 .0351117 .0339325 .0070932 PERF | .9760595 .9355094 .0405501 .0247163 SIZE | .5007864 .9014415 -.4006551 .0848986 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic chi2(9) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) = 33.11 Prob>chi2 = 0.0001 10. KIỂM ĐỊNH GIẢ THIẾT VỀ HIỆN TƯỢNG TỰ TƯƠNG QUAN (Phần 4.4.4) Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data H0: no first-order autocorrelation F( 1, 375) = 15.772 Prob > F = 0.0001 151 11. MÔ HÌNH HỒI QUY ẢNH HƯỞNG CỐ ĐỊNH (SE VỮNG) (Sau khi loại IDV) Fixed-effects (within) regression Number of obs = 2132 Group variable: id Number of groups = 537 R-sq: within = 0.1460 Obs per group: min = 1 between = 0.4539 avg = 4.0 overall = 0.4060 max = 5 F(8,536) = 10.51 corr(u_i, Xb) = 0.2487 Prob > F = 0.0000 (Std. Err. adjusted for 537 clusters in id) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | Robust DA | Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] -------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- BOARD | -.0309191 .0155239 -1.99 0.047 -.0614143 -.0004239 DUAL | .0241073 .0294792 0.82 0.414 -.0338015 .0820162 OWN1 | .0010356 .0005792 1.79 0.074 -.0001022 .0021734 OWN2 | -.0024379 .0014087 -1.73 0.084 -.0052051 .0003292 AUDIT | -.1309162 .0542869 -2.41 0.016 -.2375574 -.0242751 DEBT | .0692234 .0139358 4.97 0.000 .041848 .0965989 PERF | .9751293 .1179378 8.27 0.000 .7434523 1.206806 SIZE | .4993426 .1518575 3.29 0.001 .2010337 .7976515 _cons | -5.881925 1.75795 -3.35 0.001 -9.335241 -2.428609 -------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- sigma_u | .65393904 sigma_e | .3439851 rho | .7832711 (fraction of variance due to u_i) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 152 12. MÔ HÌNH HỒI QUY ẢNH HƯỞNG CỐ ĐỊNH (SE VỮNG) (Phần 4.4.5) (Sau khi loại IDV, DUAL) Fixed-effects (within) regression Number of obs = 2132 Group variable: id Number of groups = 537 R-sq: within = 0.1457 Obs per group: min = 1 between = 0.4543 avg = 4.0 overall = 0.4057 max = 5 F(7,536) = 11.83 corr(u_i, Xb) = 0.2471 Prob > F = 0.0000 (Std. Err. adjusted for 537 clusters in id) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | Robust DA | Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] -------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- BOARD | -.0311659 .0155145 -2.01 0.045 -.0616426 -.0006893 OWN1 | .00099 .0005814 1.70 0.089 -.0001522 .0021322 OWN2 | -.0024879 .0014037 -1.77 0.077 -.0052454 .0002696 AUDIT | -.1322678 .054387 -2.43 0.015 -.2391056 -.0254299 DEBT | .0693064 .0139764 4.96 0.000 .0418512 .0967616 PERF | .9779579 .1177653 8.30 0.000 .7466197 1.209296 SIZE | .4985939 .1519674 3.28 0.001 .2000691 .7971186 _cons | -5.861913 1.76066 -3.33 0.001 -9.320554 -2.403272 -------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- sigma_u | .65358301 sigma_e | .34394097 rho | .78312973 (fraction of variance due to u_i) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 153 PHẦN 2 –KẾT QUẢ THỰC HIỆN PHÂN TÍCH ĐƠN BIẾN (Phần 4.3) Biến DA được chia ra 2 nhóm: DA dương POS, gán giá trị = 1 DA âm NEG, gán giá trị = 0 1. PHÂN TÍCH SỰ KHÁC BIỆT VỀ DEBT TRONG NHÓM DA (+) VÀ DA (-) Two-sample t test with unequal variances ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Group | Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] ---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 0 | 617 1.544033 .0607943 1.510099 1.424644 1.663422 1 | 1515 2.201279 .0497665 1.937061 2.103661 2.298898 ---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- combined | 2132 2.011072 .0400157 1.847667 1.932599 2.089546 ---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- diff | -.6572461 .0785662 -.8113615 -.5031307 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ diff = mean(0) - mean(1) t = -8.3655 Ho: diff = 0 Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom = 1452.77 Ha: diff 0 Pr(T |t|) = 0.0000 Pr(T > t) = 1.0000 2. PHÂN TÍCH SỰ KHÁC BIỆT VỀ PERF TRONG NHÓM DA (+) VÀ DA (-) Two-sample t test with unequal variances ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Group | Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] ---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 0 | 617 .0791913 .0076514 .1900565 .0641653 .0942172 1 | 1515 .1365113 .0036955 .1438403 .1292624 .1437601 ---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- combined | 2132 .1199229 .0034798 .1606768 .1130986 .1267471 ---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- diff | -.05732 .0084971 -.073996 -.040644 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ diff = mean(0) - mean(1) t = -6.7458 Ho: diff = 0 Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom = 916.621 Ha: diff 0 Pr(T |t|) = 0.0000 Pr(T > t) = 1.0000 154 3. PHÂN TÍCH SỰ KHÁC BIỆT VỀ SIZE TRONG NHÓM DA (+) VÀ DA (-) Two-sample t test with unequal variances ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Group | Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] ---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 0 | 617 11.1415 .0178079 .4423394 11.10653 11.17648 1 | 1515 11.99037 .0129366 .5035319 11.965 12.01575 ---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- combined | 2132 11.74471 .0134372 .6204424 11.71836 11.77106 ---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- diff | -.8488688 .0220109 -.8920497 -.8056878 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ diff = mean(0) - mean(1) t = -38.5659 Ho: diff = 0 Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom = 1291.39 Ha: diff 0 Pr(T |t|) = 0.0000 Pr(T > t) = 1.0000 4. PHÂN TÍCH SỰ KHÁC BIỆT VỀ BOARD TRONG NHÓM DA (+) VÀ DA (-) Two-sample t test with unequal variances ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Group | Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] ---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 0 | 617 5.23825 .0318675 .7915722 5.175667 5.300832 1 | 1515 5.590099 .02965 1.154067 5.53194 5.648258 ---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- combined | 2132 5.488274 .0232537 1.073705 5.442672 5.533876 ---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- diff | -.3518494 .0435277 -.437225 -.2664738 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ diff = mean(0) - mean(1) t = -8.0833 Ho: diff = 0 Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom = 1643.13 Ha: diff 0 Pr(T |t|) = 0.0000 Pr(T > t) = 1.0000 155 5. PHÂN TÍCH SỰ KHÁC BIỆT VỀ IDV TRONG NHÓM DA (+) VÀ DA (-) Two-sample t test with unequal variances ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Group | Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] ---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 0 | 617 3.298217 .0391696 .9729524 3.221295 3.375139 1 | 1515 3.551815 .0320539 1.247635 3.48894 3.61469 ---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- combined | 2132 3.478424 .0255592 1.18016 3.4283 3.528548 ---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- diff | -.253598 .0506134 -.3528811 -.1543149 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ diff = mean(0) - mean(1) t = -5.0105 Ho: diff = 0 Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom = 1452.3 Ha: diff 0 Pr(T |t|) = 0.0000 Pr(T > t) = 1.0000 6. PHÂN TÍCH SỰ KHÁC BIỆT VỀ OWN1 TRONG NHÓM DA (+) VÀ DA (-) Two-sample t test with unequal variances ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Group | Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] ---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 0 | 617 23.83442 .9306163 23.11603 22.00686 25.66199 1 | 1515 25.96703 .6658756 25.91787 24.66089 27.27316 ---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- combined | 2132 25.34985 .5447357 25.1524 24.28158 26.41812 ---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- diff | -2.132606 1.144306 -4.37754 .1123288 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ diff = mean(0) - mean(1) t = -1.8637 Ho: diff = 0 Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom = 1272.5 Ha: diff 0 Pr(T |t|) = 0.0626 Pr(T > t) = 0.9687 156 7. PHÂN TÍCH SỰ KHÁC BIỆT VỀ OWN2 TRONG NHÓM DA (+) VÀ DA (-) Two-sample t test with unequal variances ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Group | Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] ---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 0 | 617 2.656798 .2341729 5.816735 2.196924 3.116672 1 | 1515 6.355176 .2981646 11.60546 5.770317 6.940035 ---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- combined | 2132 5.284867 .2253668 10.40599 4.842905 5.726829 ---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- diff | -3.698378 .3791294 -4.441898 -2.954858 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ diff = mean(0) - mean(1) t = -9.7549 Ho: diff = 0 Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom = 2045.24 Ha: diff 0 Pr(T |t|) = 0.0000 Pr(T > t) = 1.0000 8. PHÂN TÍCH SỰ KHÁC BIỆT VỀ DUAL TRONG NHÓM DA (+) VÀ DA (-) | DUAL DA | 0.00 1.00 | Total -----------+----------------------+---------- 0 | 356 261 | 617 | 26.04 34.12 | 28.94 -----------+----------------------+---------- 1 | 1,011 504 | 1,515 | 73.96 65.88 | 71.06 -----------+----------------------+---------- Total | 1,367 765 | 2,132 | 100 100 | 100.00 Pearson chi2(1) = 15.5535 Pr = 0.000 9. PHÂN TÍCH SỰ KHÁC BIỆT VỀ AUDIT TRONG NHÓM DA (+) VÀ DA (-) | AUDIT DA | 0.00 1.00 | Total -----------+----------------------+---------- 0 | 579 38 | 617 | 34.86 8.07 | 28.94 -----------+----------------------+---------- 1 | 1,082 433 | 1,515 | 65.14 91.93 | 71.06 -----------+----------------------+---------- Total | 1,661 471 | 2,132 | 100 100 | 100.00 Pearson chi2(1) = 128.0690 Pr = 0.000

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